Economics at your fingertips  

Do positional preferences cause welfare gains?

Douadia Bougherara, Sandrine Costa (), Gilles Grolleau () and Lisette Ibanez ()
Additional contact information
Sandrine Costa: MOISA, Univ Montpellier, CIRAD, CIHEAM-IAMM, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, Montpellier, France
Gilles Grolleau: CEE-M, Univ Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Supagro, Univ. Bourgogne, Burgundy School of Business-CEREN
Lisette Ibanez: CEE-M, Univ Montpellier, CNRS , INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, Montpellier, France

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 2, 1228-1241

Abstract: We examine conditions for which positional preferences for voluntary contribution to a public good can be welfare enhancing in a one-shot public good game, where individuals may also enjoy a return from their contribution ranking. We show that positional preferences are welfare-increasing only under certain conditions. We find that when agents' positional preferences are homogeneous, they overinvest in the public good compared to equilibrium with no positional preferences, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher public good provision. When agents have heterogeneous positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogeneous.

Keywords: Position; Public goods; Status (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05-15
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().

Page updated 2019-07-22
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00362