Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies

Leo K Simon and Maxwell B Stinchcombe

Econometrica, 1989, vol. 57, issue 5, 1171-1214

Abstract: A new framework for games in continuous time is proposed. The continuous-time model conforms as closely as possible to the conventional discrete-time framework. Indeed, continuous time is viewed as "discrete time, but with a grid that is infinitely fine." The paper presents several examples illustrating the difficulties that arise in continuous-time game theory. Theorems relate the equilibria of continuous time games to the equilibria of approximating discrete time games. A variety of industrial organization applications are studied, yielding sharp predictions. Applications include continuously repeated games, preemption models, and patent races. Copyright 1989 by The Econometric Society.

Date: 1989
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Related works:
Working Paper: Extensive From Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies (1987)
Working Paper: Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies (1987)
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