Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies

Leo K. Simon and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Maxwell Stinchcombe (max.stinchcombe@gmail.com) and Leo K. Simon

No 8746, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Date: 1987-07-01
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Journal Article: Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies (1989)
Working Paper: Extensive From Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies (1987)
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