Extensive From Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies

Leo Simon and Maxwell Stinchcombe ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: Game theory; continuous-time games; subgame perfect equilibrium; coordination games; patent races; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987-07-16
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Related works:
Journal Article: Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies (1989)
Working Paper: Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies (1987)
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