Optimal Use of Communication Resources

Olivier Gossner, Penélope Hernández and Abraham Neyman ()

Econometrica, 2006, vol. 74, issue 6, 1603-1636

Abstract: We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal use of communication resources (2006)
Working Paper: OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2004)
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