Optimal Use of Communication Resources

Olivier Gossner, Penelope Hernandez () and Abraham Neyman ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

JEL-codes: C61 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2004-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal use of communication resources (2006)
Working Paper: OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES (2005)
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