Optimal use of communication resources

Olivier Gossner, Penelope Hernandez () and Abraham Neyman ()

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Abstract: We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

Keywords: Communication; Information economics; Incomplete information; Entropy; Information processing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published in Econometrica, 2006, 74 (6), pp.1603-1636. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2006)
Working Paper: OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754118

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x

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