What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil

Fernanda Brollo and Ugo antonio Troiano

Journal of Development Economics, 2016, vol. 122, issue C, 28-45

Abstract: We analyze close elections between male and female mayoral candidates in Brazilian municipalities to provide novel evidence on the role of women as policymakers. Using an objective measure of corruption based on random government audits, we find that female mayors are less likely to engage in corruption compared to male mayors. We also find that female mayors hire fewer temporary public employees than male mayors during the electoral year and tend to attract less campaign contributions when running for reelection. Moreover, our results show that female mayors have a lower reelection probability than male mayors. We interpret our findings as suggesting that male incumbents are more likely to engage in strategic behavior and this improves their electoral performance. Other explanations receive less support from the data.

Keywords: Gender; Politics; Corruption; Patronage; Campaign contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 I00 I18 J16 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (186)

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Related works:
Working Paper: What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil (2013)
Working Paper: What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:122:y:2016:i:c:p:28-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.04.003

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