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What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil

Fernanda Brollo and Ugo antonio Troiano
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Fernanda Brollo: University of Warwick

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the e ect of the gender of local policymakers on policy outcomes. Analyzing a rich dataset from Brazilian municipalities and using a regression discontinuity design, we nd that municipalities ruled by female mayors have better health outcomes, receive more federal discretionary transfers, and have lower corruption. Additionally, male mayors hire more temporary public employees than their female counterparts when they are allowed to run for re-election, and when municipal elections are approaching. These ndings suggest that male mayors may promote more political patronage than female mayors and that men and women may respond differently to local election incentives.

Keywords: election incentives; Brazil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dem and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear ... /161-2013_brollo.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil (2013) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:161

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