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What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil

Fernanda Brollo and Ugo antonio Troiano

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect the gender of local policymakers on policy outcomes. Analyzing a rich dataset from Brazilian municipalities and using a regression discontinuity design, we find that municipalities ruled by female mayors have better health outcomes, receive more federal discretionary transfers, and have lower corruption. Additionally, male mayors hire more temporary public employees than their female counter-parts when they are allowed to run for re-election, and when municipal elections are approaching. These findings suggest that male mayors may promote more political patronage than female mayors and that men and women may respond differently to local election incentives.

Keywords: gender; politics; health; corruption; patronage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I18 J00 J16 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52244/1/MPRA_paper_52244.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil (2013) Downloads
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