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Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines

Allen Hicken, Stephen Leider (), Nico Ravanilla and Dean Yang ()

Journal of Development Economics, 2018, vol. 131, issue C, 1-14

Abstract: We report the results of a randomized field experiment in the Philippines on the effects of two common anti-vote-selling strategies involving eliciting promises from voters. An invitation to promise not to vote-sell is taken up by most respondents, reduces vote-selling, and has a larger effect in races with smaller vote-buying payments. The treatment reduces vote-selling in the smallest-stakes election by 10.9 percentage points. Inviting voters to promise to “vote your conscience” despite accepting money is significantly less effective. The results are consistent with a behavioral model in which voters are only partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation.

Keywords: Vote-selling; Vote-buying; Temptation; Self-control; Commitment; Elections; Political economy; Philippines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines (2014) Downloads
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