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Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines

Allen Hicken, Stephen Leider (), Nico Ravanilla and Dean Yang ()

No 4828, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We test the predictions of a behavioral model of transactional electoral politics in the context of a randomized anti-vote-selling intervention in the Philippines. We model selling one’s vote as a temptation good: it creates positive utility for the future self at the moment of voting, but not for past selves who anticipate the vote-sale. We also allow keeping or breaking promises regarding vote-selling to affect utility. Voters who are at least partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation can thus use promises not to vote-sell as a commitment device. An invitation to promise not to vote-sell is taken up by a majority of respondents, reduces vote-selling, and has a larger effect in electoral races with smaller vote-buying payments. The more effective promise treatment reduces vote-selling in the smallest-stakes election by 10.9 percentage points. Inviting voters to make another type of promise – to accept vote-buying payments, but to nonetheless “vote your conscience” – is significantly less effective. The results are consistent with voters being partially (but not fully) sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation.

Keywords: vote-selling; vote-buying; temptation; self-control; commitment; elections; political economy; Philippines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D72 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

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Journal Article: Temptation in vote-selling: Evidence from a field experiment in the Philippines (2018) Downloads
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