R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

Shravan Luckraz

Economic Modelling, 2011, vol. 28, issue 6, 2873-2876

Abstract: In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350–357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122–1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.

Keywords: R&D spillovers; Isoelastic demand; Cournot duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 C72 D43 D72 D92 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:28:y:2011:i:6:p:2873-2876

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2011.07.019

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