Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

Yee Jiun Yap, Shravan Luckraz and Siew Kian Tey

Economic Modelling, 2014, vol. 39, issue C, 8-18

Abstract: This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results.

Keywords: Research and development incentive; Dynamic game; Cournot duopoly; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:39:y:2014:i:c:p:8-18

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020

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