How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?

Juan Alejandro Gelves and John Heywood

Economic Modelling, 2016, vol. 59, issue C, 278-284

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that a cost disadvantaged innovator increasingly relies on licensing with a fixed fee as its public ownership share grows. Moreover, when the innovation is drastic, a cost disadvantaged innovator frequently licenses by fixed fee when it has a public share even as a fully private firm will never use a fixed fee. As the fixed fee improves welfare, these results suggest that the licensing method of a partial public firm helps correct the market failure of imperfect competition.

Keywords: Cournot; Patent licensing; Mixed duopoly; Fixed fee; Royalty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:59:y:2016:i:c:p:278-284

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.07.018

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