A note on noncompetes, bargaining and training by firms

Nicola Meccheri ()

Economics Letters, 2009, vol. 102, issue 3, 198-200

Abstract: This paper analyzes how noncompetes, via wage bargaining, can affect firms' incentives to provide their employees with on-the-job training. The results show that noncompetes increase incentives to provide general training, but reduce those related to specific training.

Keywords: Noncompetes; Bargaining; General; training; Specific; training (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(09)00017-2
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:198-200

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().