A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms
Nicola Meccheri ()
Discussion Papers from Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
This paper analyzes how non-competes, via wage bargaining, can affect firms ?T incentives to provide their employees with on-the-job training. The results show that non-competes increase incentives to provide general training, but reduce those related to specific training.
Keywords: non-competes; bargaining; general training; specific training (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J41 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-lab and nep-law
Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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Journal Article: A note on noncompetes, bargaining and training by firms (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pie:dsedps:2008/72
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