Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Ola Andersson, Matteo Galizzi, Tim Hoppe, Sebastian Kranz, Karen van der Wiel and Erik Wengström

Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 108, issue 1, 16-18

Abstract: We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

Keywords: Persuasion; Communication; in; games; Cheap; talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(10)00110-2
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games (2008)
Working Paper: Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:16-18

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().