Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games
Sebastian Kranz (),
Karen van der Wiel and
Erik Wengström ()
Working Papers from University of Brescia, Department of Economics
This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.
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Journal Article: Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games (2010)
Working Paper: Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubs:wpaper:0811
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