On favoritism in auctions with entry
Leandro Arozamena () and
Federico Weinschelbaum ()
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110, issue 3, 265-267
We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
Keywords: Auctions; Favoritism; Free; entry; Endogenous; number; of; bidders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: On Favoritism in Auctions with Entry (2010)
Working Paper: On favoritism in auctions with entry (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:265-267
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