On favoritism in auctions with entry
Leandro Arozamena () and
Federico Weinschelbaum ()
Department of Economics Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
Keywords: auctions; favoritism; free entry; endogenous number of bidders. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 09 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Journal Article: On favoritism in auctions with entry (2011)
Working Paper: On Favoritism in Auctions with Entry (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udt:wpecon:2010-072
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