On Favoritism in Auctions with Entry

Leandro Arozamena and Federico Weinschelbaum

No 103, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders?welfare more than her own ?private?utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.

Keywords: auctions; favoritism; free entry; endogenous number of bidders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2010-05, Revised 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc103.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On favoritism in auctions with entry (2011)
Working Paper: On favoritism in auctions with entry (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:103

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