Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
Subhasish Chowdhury and
Roman Sheremeta ()
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, 216-219
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.
Keywords: Rent-seeking; Contest; Asymmetric; equilibrium; Multiple; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests (2011)
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests (2010)
Working Paper: Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:216-219
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