Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Subhasish Chowdhury and Roman Sheremeta

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contest; asymmetric equilibrium; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52104/1/MPRA_paper_52104.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests (2011)
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests (2010)
Working Paper: Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:52104

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