Paying not to sell

Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy and Rania Mabrouk

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 1, 137-140

Abstract: In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

Keywords: Monopoly; Vertical product differentiation; Vertical relationships (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:1:p:137-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.018

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