EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Paying not to sell

Emanuele Bacchiega (), Olivier Bonroy () and R. Mabrouk

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

Keywords: MONOPOLY; VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/gael/fil ... 2013/gael2013-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Paying not to sell (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Agnès Vertier ().

 
Page updated 2019-04-22
Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-02