Paying not to sell

Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy and R. Mabrouk

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

JEL-codes: L12 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Paying not to sell (2013)
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp870

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