Demand reduction in multi-unit auctions with varying number of bidders and units

Faical Akaichi, Rodolfo Nayga and José M. Gil

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 3, 443-445

Abstract: We examine the effect of varying the number of bidders and units on bid values in multi-unit auctions. Our results suggest that the uniform-price auction is sensitive to demand reduction, however, increasing the number of bidders or/and units can significantly decrease it.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Demand reduction; Bidders’ number; Units’ number (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:443-445

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.006

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