Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity

Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernan Gonzalez and Praveen Kujal

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 147, issue C, 168-170

Abstract: We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.

Keywords: Investment game; Uncertainty; Ambiguity; Trust; Trustworthiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 C9 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Trust and Trustworthiness under Information Asymmetry and Ambiguity (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:168-170

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019

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