Trust and Trustworthiness under Information Asymmetry and Ambiguity

Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernan Gonzalez and Praveen Kujal

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.

Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-17

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