Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts
Guillaume Cheikbossian () and
Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 168, issue C, 77-81
We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual efforts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.
Keywords: Group size paradox; Group contest; Complementarity; (Impure) Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts (2018)
Working Paper: Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:77-81
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