Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

Guillaume Cheikbossian and Romain Fayat
Additional contact information
Romain Fayat: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual efforts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize

Keywords: group size paradox; group contest; complementarity; (impure) public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in International workshop on Environmental Economics and Natural Resources, CREM. Centre de recherche en économie & management, Jun 2018, Rennes, France

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts (2018)
Working Paper: Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02156268

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().