Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

Guillaume Cheikbossian and Romain Fayat
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Romain Fayat: UM - Université de Montpellier

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Abstract: We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual efforts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.

Keywords: Group contest; Complementarity; (Impure) Public good; Group size paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Economics Letters, 2018, 168, pp.77-81. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.011⟩

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Journal Article: Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts (2018)
Working Paper: Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02624005

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.011

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