On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability

Tim Friehe, Eric Langlais and Elisabeth Schulte

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 173, issue C, 128-130

Abstract: Traditional law and economics analyses of products liability find that different liability regimes lead to the same market outcome, implying that risk-neutral consumers are indifferent between products liability and no products liability. We present a setup in which a group of consumers supports the implementation of products liability although its enforcement is costly. All consumers may prefer the same level of (partial) products liability.

Keywords: Product liability; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (2018)
Working Paper: On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (2018)
Working Paper: On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:173:y:2018:i:c:p:128-130

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.006

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