On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability

Tim Friehe, Eric Langlais and Elisabeth Schulte

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Abstract: Traditional law and economics analyses of products liability find that different liability regimes lead to the same market outcome, implying that risk-neutral consumers are indifferent between products liability and no products liability. We present a setup in which a group of consumers supports the implementation of products liability although its enforcement is costly. All consumers may prefer the same level of (partial) products liability.

Keywords: Product Liability; Monopoly; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04141684
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Journal Article: On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (2018)
Working Paper: On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (2018)
Working Paper: On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (2018)
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