On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability
Eric Langlais () and
No 2018-43, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
Traditional law and economics analyses of products liability find that different liability regimes lead to the same market outcome, implying that risk-neutral consumers are indifferent between products liability and no products liability. We present a setup in which a group of consumers supports the implementation of products liability although its enforcement is costly. All consumers may prefer the same level of (partial) products liability.
Keywords: Product Liability; Monopoly; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: On consumer preferences for (partial) products liability (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2018-43
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