Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities?

Edward Cartwright and Abhijit Ramalingam

Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 179, issue C, 42-45

Abstract: We disentangle the effects of choice (give vs. take) and externality (positive vs. negative) framing of decisions in isomorphic and payoff-equivalent experimental public good games. We find that, at the aggregate level, neither frame affects group contributions. At the individual level, the Take choice frame leads to greater free-riding, and also to somewhat higher contributions, i.e., to more extreme contribution behaviour.

Keywords: Isomorphic; Public goods; Experiment; Cooperation; Choice frame; Externality frame (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D02 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities? (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:42-45

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.020

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