Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities?

Edward Cartwright and Abhijit Ramalingam

No 19-07, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: We disentangle the effects of choice (give vs. take) and externality (positive vs. negative) framing of decisions in isomorphic and payoff-equivalent experimental public good games. We find that, at the aggregate level, neither frame affects group contributions. At the individual level, the Take choice frame leads to greater free-riding, and also to somewhat higher contributions, i.e., to more extreme contribution behaviour. Key Words: isomorphic; public goods; experiment; cooperation; choice frame; externality frame

JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D02 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Framing effects in public good games: Choices or externalities? (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apl:wpaper:19-07

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