Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 222, issue C

Abstract: In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor informal agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

Keywords: Guilt aversion; Promise-keeping; Informal agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D03 D64 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176522004050
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2022)
Working Paper: Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:222:y:2023:i:c:s0165176522004050

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110931

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().