Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli

No 153, CIMEO, Sapienza University of Rome from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome

Abstract: Messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements in a game with pre-play bilateral communication. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

Date: 2022-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2023)
Working Paper: Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00153

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