Work motivation and teams

Simone Haeckl, Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran

Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 244, issue C

Abstract: This paper presents a novel technique to measure motivation for working on a task using deviations from the money-maximising benchmark in a real-effort experiment. Although we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we also find that workers with high intrinsic motivation do not respond to team incentives. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard, and team incentives are not strong enough to overcome the high cost of additional effort.

Keywords: Real-effort experiment; Cooperation; Team; Motivation; Labour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J33 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Work Motivation and Teams (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:244:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524005044

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112020

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