Work Motivation and Teams

Simone Haeckl, Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 18-08, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a new measure of work motivation and show that motivation shapes the effects of team incentives and observation by peers on performance. In particular, we measure motivation to work hard as the deviation from the money-maximizing benchmark in a real-effort experiment. While we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we find that highly motivated workers do not respond. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard and increasing effort even further is very costly to them.

Keywords: real-effort experiment; cooperation; team; intrinsic motivation; labors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J33 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2018-08-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Work motivation and teams (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1808

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