Work Motivation and Teams
Rupert Sausgruber and
Jean-Robert Tyran ()
Additional contact information
Simone Haeckl: Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business
No 18-08, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
We provide a new measure of work motivation and show that motivation shapes the effects of team incentives and observation by peers on performance. In particular, we measure motivation to work hard as the deviation from the money-maximizing benchmark in a real-effort experiment. While we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we find that highly motivated workers do not respond. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard and increasing effort even further is very costly to them.
Keywords: real-effort experiment; cooperation; team; intrinsic motivation; labors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J33 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1808
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann ().