Receiving credit: On delegation and responsibility

Cédric Argenton, Jan Potters and Yadi Yang

European Economic Review, 2023, vol. 158, issue C

Abstract: Evidence has shown that blame for a “bad” decision can be shifted by delegating the decision to someone else. We conduct experiments using a four-player delegated dictator game to examine whether the reverse is also true: does one receive credit for taking a “good” decision as compared to delegating the decision to someone else? Our results indicate that the answer is affirmative. A person receives higher rewards when she makes a fair decision herself than when a delegate does. This indicates that responsibility attribution is a double-edged sword that applies to both bad and good outcomes.

Keywords: Delegation; Reward; Responsibility attribution; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Receiving credit: On delegation and responsibility (2023)
Working Paper: Receiving Credit: On Delegation and Responsibility (2022)
Working Paper: Receiving Credit: On Delegation and Responsibility (2022)
Working Paper: Receiving Credit: On Delegation and Responsibility (2022)
Working Paper: Receiving Credit: On Delegation and Responsibility (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:158:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123001514

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104522

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