Intelligence and strategy choice in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: A replication of Proto, Rustichini & Sofianos (2022)

Michalis Drouvelis and Graeme Pearce

European Economic Review, 2025, vol. 178, issue C

Abstract: We provide a close replication of the original study of Proto et al. (2022) which examines the link between intelligence, strategy choice and errors in strategy implementation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Our experiments, powered at 99% to detect the effect sizes obtained in the original study, replicate all the findings of the original study: (1) cooperation rates in the first period of an indefinitely repeated game are not found to be correlated with intelligence; (2) subjects with a higher level of intelligence are more likely to be conditionally cooperative; (3) more intelligent subjects make fewer errors when implementing their strategy. Our experiments validate the results of the original study, and lend credence to its findings.

Keywords: Cooperation; Intelligence; Replication; Repeated; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292125001254
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:178:y:2025:i:c:s0014292125001254

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105075

Access Statistics for this article

European Economic Review is currently edited by T.S. Eicher, A. Imrohoroglu, E. Leeper, J. Oechssler and M. Pesendorfer

More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().