Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments

Miguel Fonseca and Hans-Theo Normann

European Economic Review, 2012, vol. 56, issue 8, 1759-1772

Abstract: We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation.

Keywords: Cartels; Collusion; Communication; Experiments; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 L4 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (161)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:8:p:1759-1772

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.002

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