The limits to moral erosion in markets: Social norms and the replacement excuse

Björn Bartling and Yagiz Özdemir

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 138, issue C, 143-160

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor might step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. In a series of experiments, we study whether people invoke the replacement excuse, that is, the argument “if I don't do it, someone else will,” to justify narrowly self-interested actions. Our data are consistent with the possibility that the existence of a clear social norm of moral conduct can limit the impact of the availability of the replacement excuse on behavior.

Keywords: Replacement excuse; Social norms; Moral behavior; Competition; Markets; Utilitarianism; Deontological ethics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D01 D02 D63 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Limits to Moral Erosion in Markets: Social Norms and the Replacement Excuse (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:138:y:2023:i:c:p:143-160

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.001

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