A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
Mariana Blanco (),
Dirk Engelmann () and
Hans-Theo Normann ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 2, 321-338
We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences--inequality aversion--using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects.
Keywords: Behavioral; economics; Experimental; economics; Inequality; aversion; Other-regarding; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (237) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:321-338
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().