A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences

Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann and Hans-Theo Normann

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 2, 321-338

Abstract: We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences--inequality aversion--using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects.

Keywords: Behavioral; economics; Experimental; economics; Inequality; aversion; Other-regarding; preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (391)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:321-338

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