Is targeted advertising always beneficial?

Nada Ben Elhadj, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed and Didier Laussel ()

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011, vol. 29, issue 6, 678-689

Abstract: In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their “natural markets”, while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising.

Keywords: Targeted and random advertising; Advertising cost; Spatial differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L13 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:6:p:678-689

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.03.002

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