Regulating commissions in markets with advice

Roman Inderst

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2015, vol. 43, issue C, 137-141

Abstract: The paper explores the implications of regulating commissions in markets with advice. It provides a review of recent contributions dealing with policies that mandate disclosure, impose caps on commissions, restrict the steepness of commissions, or require the deferral of commissions.

Keywords: Commissions; Advice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:137-141

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.05.005

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