Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Paola Conconi, David DeRemer, Georg Kirchsteiger, Lorenzo Trimarchi and Maurizio Zanardi

Journal of International Economics, 2017, vol. 105, issue C, 57-76

Abstract: This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995–2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

Keywords: Trade disputes; Elections; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D72 D78 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Suspiciously timed trade disputes (2017)
Working Paper: Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes (2015)
Working Paper: Suspiciously Timed Trade Disputes (2015)
Working Paper: Suspiciously timed trade disputes (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:57-76

DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

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